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Being Persuaded to Sleep with
Someone in Order to Have a Place
to Sleep: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Analysis of Sexual Harassment
Claims Under the Fair Housing Act
Stella Preston*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental ideals the United States was built upon is
that its citizens must have their rights and freedoms protected.
Historically, however, there have been numerous groups of individuals
who have had their civil rights infringed upon, and what is worse, not
protected by the legal and political institutions of the country. What the
United States is experiencing now is an increase in the widespread
fight for those who have historically been discriminated against in one
way or another. Citizens these days seem less apt to sit back and
silently let injustices go on without any repercussions. In particular,
one social fight of importance is the fight for those who have been
victims of sexual assault or sexual misconduct.1

*I would like to first extend my deepest gratitude to Professor David Ritchie for his
invaluable guidance throughout this writing process. I would also like to thank my
parents for their constant love and support, and for always believing in me and my
abilities no matter what. Finally, I want to express how thankful I am for my fellow Law
Review members for their support along the way. I could not have done this without you!
1. Jocelyn Noveck and MaryClaire Dale, #MeToo, 4 years in: ‘I’d like to think now,
we
are
believed’,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(October
15,
2021),
https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idc331ef02d8911ec86c3db30f5ade17c/View/FullText.
html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
The
#MeToo movement started gaining notoriety a few years ago. The movement aims at
empowering women to come forward about their stories of sexual misconduct or
harassment they have been subjected to, specifically at the hands of men in powerful
positions.
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All around the country, more and more men and women are coming
forward about their experiences as victims of sexual assault in hopes
that it sparks real change. In fact, according to a poll conducted by The
Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs research, about half of
Americans (54%) say they are now more likely to speak out if they
become a victim of sexual misconduct or assault.2 Specifically, within
the housing industry, instances of sexual misconduct have garnered
heightened attention and have warranted fundamental changes to be
made.3
Fox v. Gaines,4 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, highlights the importance of protecting individuals
from sexual assault or sexual harassment in any aspect of life. The
holding in Fox allows men and women to seek redress for quid pro quo
and hostile housing environment sexual harassment they may
encounter in the housing context.5 By using a similar interpretation to
that of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,6 the court held, as a
matter of first impression, that sexual harassment qualifies as sex
discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA),7 joining four
of its sister circuits around the United States.8
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While searching for a new apartment for her and her child, Ms. Fox
visited the Rose Bush Apartments in Jupiter, Florida, owned by Ms.
Lucille Gaines and managed by Mr. Dana Gaines.9 From the time that
she applied for the unit, Mr. Gaines made Ms. Fox feel uncomfortable
and unsettled, making inappropriate comments about her looks. Mr.
Gaines even went so far as to barter with Ms. Fox for a kiss.10 He told

2. Noveck and Dale, supra note 1.
3. Cecily Fuhr, Annotation, Cause of Action by Tenant Against Landlord for Sexual
Harassment, 93 C.O.A.2d 679 § 2 (2020).
[B]etween the launch of the Department of Justice’s Sexual Harassment in
Housing Initiative in 2017 and the time of writing, the DOJ has filed 11
lawsuits alleging a pattern or practice of sexual harassment in housing, filed or
settled 15 sexual harassment cases, and recovered over $2.6 million for victims
of sexual harassment in housing.
4. 4 F.4th 1293 (11th Cir. 2021).
5. Id. at 1297.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2021).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2021).
8. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1295.
9. Id. at 1294 n. 2. There is no indication in the record whether Lucille and Dana are
related or not, but practically, it does not matter here.
10. Id. at 1294.
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her, “[H]e had a list of people interested in the unit but would ‘keep it
available for her if she would give him a kiss.’”11 Although Mr. Gaines’s
actions and comments made Ms. Fox feel uneasy about renting the
apartment, she knew she needed it. After signing the lease and getting
the keys, Mr. Gaines reminded Ms. Fox about the kiss; she felt trapped
and as if she had no other choice, so she eventually kissed him.12
After paying the security deposit, as well as first and last months’
rent, Ms. Fox had a hard time making the full monthly rent payments
for her apartment. In response to this, Mr. Gaines proposed helping Ms.
Fox with her rent in exchange for her providing him with sexual favors.
Ms. Fox ultimately gave in to Mr. Gaines’s offer, and their arrangement
went on for about three and a half years.13 Mr. Gaines lowered Ms.
Fox’s rent as long as she gave him sexual favors.14
In addition to their arrangement, Mr. Gaines started monitoring Ms.
Fox and questioning her whereabouts, began demanding Ms. Fox not
invite men to her apartment, and installed surveillance cameras facing
in the direction of her unit so he could track her daily activities.15 Ms.
Fox wanted “[T]o stop Mr. Gaines’s ‘controlling and harassing behavior,’
[so she] ended her sexual relationship with him.”16 But in response, Mr.
Gaines began threatening Ms. Fox with eviction and giving her
fraudulent notices of violations.17 The next week, Ms. Fox paid the same
reduced rent payment she had been making for the past three and a
half years and told Mr. Gaines that she would pay the rest within the
next eight days. However, even though Ms. Fox made good on her
promise and paid the remainder eight days later, Mr. Gaines told her
that he had to file an eviction proceeding on her because she did not pay
it within seven days. Mr. Gaines tried serving Ms. Fox with a three-day
notice to vacate the apartment and, even after mutually agreeing that
Ms. Fox would move out by midnight on the last day of the month, he

11. Id. (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 6, Fox v. Gaines, No. 9:19-cv-81620AHS, (S.D. Fla. March 16, 2020), ECF No. 39).
12. Id. at 1294.
13. Ms. Fox paid between $400 and $600 for rent most months, and Mr. Gaines would
cover the difference. Second Amended Complaint at 7, Fox v. Gaines, No. 9:19-cv-81620AHS, (S.D. Fla. March 16, 2020), ECF No. 39.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1294 (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 7, Fox v. Gaines, No.
9:19-cv-81620-AHS, (S.D. Fla. March 16, 2020), ECF No. 39).
17. Id. Many of these fraudulent violation notices claimed that Ms. Fox needed to
clean up the area around her apartment. Exhibit C, Fox v. Gaines, No. 9:19-cv-81620AHS, (S.D. Fla. January 18, 2020), ECF No. 25.
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called the police during the last day of the month and tried having Ms.
Fox arrested for trespassing.18
After being forced to vacate her apartment, Ms. Fox sued both Dana
and Lucille Gaines, “arguing that Mr. Gaines’s sexual harassment of
her violated the FHA’s and Florida FHA’s prohibitions on sex
discrimination.”19 The case at hand was first heard in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, but both Mr. and Ms.
Gaines’s motions to dismiss were granted.20 The court noted that, while
“Ms. Fox had ‘sufficiently pled “severe, pervasive harassment”‘ that was
‘well beyond what was required to withstand a motion to dismiss,’”21 her
sexual harassment claim ultimately was not actionable under the FHA.
This decision was guided by the court’s conclusion that the plain
language of the statute did not allow for a claim of sexual harassment.22
Ms. Fox appealed the dismissal of her claims. The appeal brought
this question of first impression to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, finally allowing the court to address and rule
on the issue.23 The Eleventh Circuit held that sexual harassment “is
actionable under the FHA, provided the plaintiff demonstrates that she
would not have been harassed but for her sex.”24 Ultimately, the
dismissal was vacated, and the case was remanded to the district court
for further proceedings.25
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fair Housing Act of 1968
The Fair Housing Act is the common name given to Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.26 The main purpose of this federal statute is to
prohibit discrimination in the sale and rental of housing, as well as
other housing-related transactions, based on race, color, national origin,
religion, sex, familial status, and disability.27 In relation to sex

18. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1294–95.
19. Id. at 1295.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Order on Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, Fox v. Gaines, No. 9:19-cv-81620AHS, (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2020), ECF No. 51).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1297.
25. Id.
26. Lora A. Lucero, Annotation, Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et. seq.)Supreme Court Cases, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3, 2 (2018).
27. Id.
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discrimination, some of these prohibitions include, but are not limited
to, the refusal to rent or sell, or negotiate to rent or sell, because of sex;
discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a sale or rental
because of sex; and showing any preference of sex in the advertising of a
sale or rental.28 The FHA was passed and enacted by Congress in the
midst of the civil rights movement, with the hope of providing fair
housing throughout the country for all races and other historically
disadvantaged groups, including women.29
Since its enactment, causes of actions under the FHA have been
raised many times by individuals looking to recover for the unfair sales
or rental practices of landlords. However, it took some time for
individuals to bring cases under the FHA for discrimination stemming
from sexual harassment, or from creating a hostile or offensive sexual
environment. The two main types of sexual harassment cases that have
since been brought under the FHA are quid pro quo sexual harassment
and the creation of a hostile housing environment.30 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment occurs when one offers or provides the other some
kind of benefit in exchange for sexual favors. Hostile environment
sexual harassment occurs when the sexual harassment is so pervasive
and severe that it changes the conditions of the housing arrangement.31
One of the first cases to discuss the issue of sexual harassment in the
housing environment was Shellhammer v. Lewallen,32 which, although
the plaintiffs did not carry their burden in pleading their claim for it,
nonetheless paved the way for a claim of sexual harassment being
actionable under the FHA if it creates an offensive environment for the
renter.33 The plaintiffs in this case, a husband and wife who were
renters of an apartment owned by the defendants, presented two
different legal claims: (1) that the landlord’s sexual harassment of the
wife created an offensive environment for their tenancy; and (2) that
their landlords made their tenancy subject to sexual consideration.34
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
found that the plaintiffs had factually proven the second claim (the
plaintiffs were evicted shortly after the wife refused sexual advances

28. David J. Stephenson, Jr., Annotation, Actions Under Fair Housing Act (42
U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et seq.), Based on Sexual Harassment or Creation of Hostile
Environment, 144 A.L.R. Fed. 595, 1 (1988).
29. Lucero, supra note 26, at 3.
30. Stephenson, Jr., supra note 28 at 6.
31. Id.
32. 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985).
33. Id. at 3–4.
34. Id. at 3.
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from the landlord), but did not meet their burden of proof for the first
claim. They found that the wife:
[P]oints to two requests during the three to four months of her
tenancy. This does not amount to the pervasive and persistent
conduct which is a predicate to finding that the sexual harassment
created a burdensome situation which caused the tenancy to be
significantly less desirable than it would have been had the
harassment not occurred.35

So, while the plaintiffs in that case did not prevail on their claim that
the sexual harassment by their landlord created a hostile or offensive
housing environment, the court established the possibility of this claim
being adjudicated in the future.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
In order to understand how the FHA’s provision prohibiting sex
discrimination has been translated to prohibiting sexual harassment, it
is important to understand sexual harassment claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VII), which prohibits, among other
things, sex discrimination in the workplace. In Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB, v. Vinson,36 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
claim for sexual harassment, amounting to a hostile environment at
work, is a form of sex discrimination and is therefore actionable under
Title VII.37 When a supervisor, or someone in a superior position,
“sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that
supervisor ‘discriminates’ on the basis of sex.”38 Meritor was a landmark
case in that it established a cause of action for sexual harassment in the
workplace under Title VII. It also established the idea that Title VII’s
language prohibiting sex discrimination was not limited to just sexual
harassment creating economic or tangible injury, but sexual
harassment leading to noneconomic injury as well.39
The provisions of Title VII with language prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex have been interpreted and analyzed similarly to
those in the FHA when it comes to sexual harassment claims. In fact,
many courts over time “have recognized that Title VIII is the functional
equivalent of Title VII, . . . and so the provisions of these two statutes
35. Id. at 4 (quoting the magistrate from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio).
36. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
37. Id. at 73.
38. Id. at 64.
39. Id. at 64–65.
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are given like construction and application.”40 In the case discussed
above, Shellhammer, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit mentioned that the lower court analogized the plaintiff’s claims
(sexual harassment creating a hostile housing environment) to similar
actions brought under Title VII, citing Henson v. City of Dundee41 in its
analysis.42
Further, in DiCenso v. Cisneros,43 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit incorporated Title VII doctrines into its analysis
of the plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment amounting to a hostile
environment, violating the FHA.44 For example, for one to bring a
sexual harassment cause of action under Title VII, “it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”45 The
Seventh Circuit then applied this principle to discrimination within the
housing context, saying that a claim for sexual harassment under the
FHA is actionable if it unreasonably interferes with the use and
enjoyment of their premises or property.46 The court also emphasized
the importance of looking at the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the claim: namely, the frequency of the alleged
discrimination and its severity; if it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or just an offensive statement; and whether it interferes
with the tenant’s housing environment.47 The Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly held that “isolated and innocuous incidents” are not enough
to support a claim for sexual harassment.48 The court emphasizes the
importance of looking at the frequency of the abusive or harassing
behavior.49

40. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Services, Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
41. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
42. Shellhammer, 770 F.2d 167 at 3–4.
43. 96 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1996).
44. Id. at 1008.
45. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
46. Id. (quoting Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. However, the court ends by noting that its holding does not necessarily mean
that a single incident of harassment will never be enough support for an actionable claim.
But, in this case, it was not. Id. at 1009.
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C. The Florida Fair Housing Act
The Florida federal FHA50 was enacted to provide fair housing
throughout the entire state of Florida and is virtually identical to that
of the FHA. The applicable sections of both statutes even have the same
title: “Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and other
prohibited practices.”51 Both statutes contain the same provisions
regarding the prohibition of sex discrimination in the sale and rental of
housing, and courts have interpreted, analyzed, and applied it in the
same way as the FHA.52 In Loren v. Sasser, the Eleventh Circuit used
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), allowing “supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy,” to
support their analysis that the Florida FHA and the federal FHA are
statutorily the same and should be interpreted identically. 53
Further, in Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condominium
Association, Inc., the court noted that “[t]he FHA and the Florida Fair
Housing Act are substantively identical, and therefore the same legal
analysis applies to each.”54 Thus, courts faced with the task of
evaluating a claim under the Florida FHA will look to the federal FHA
for guidance.
D. Sister Circuits’ Take on Sexual Harassment Claims under the FHA
Every United States Circuit Court of Appeals which has addressed
the question of whether the FHA provides a cause of action for sexual
harassment in the housing environment has answered in the
affirmative.55 One of the earliest circuits to look at and adopt this rule
was the Tenth Circuit. In Honce v. Vigil, the court analogized sexual
harassment claims under the FHA to those in the workplace.56
Ultimately, the court held that a claim for sexual harassment is
actionable when it creates a hostile housing environment, and

50. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.23 (2020).
51. 42 U.S.C.S. § 3604; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.23.
52. Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285
(11th Cir. 2014) (citing Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002)).
53. Loren, 309 F.3d at 1299 n.9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2021)).
54. Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285. See also Philippeaux v. Apartment Inv. and
Management Co., 598 F. App’x. 640, 643–44 (11th Cir. 2015); Noah v. Assor, 379 F. Supp.
3d 1284, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2019). The Florida FHA is the state counterpart to the federal
FHA.
55. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1295 n.5.
56. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1088.

2022

BEING PERSUADED TO SLEEP

1427

“unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the premises.”57 In
2010, the Eighth Circuit affirmed and further held that claims for
sexual harassment causing a hostile housing environment, and quid pro
quo sexual harassment claims, are actionable under the FHA.58 The
court noted that quid pro quo sexual harassment in this context
happens “when housing benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned
on sexual favors.”59
As mentioned above, the Seventh Circuit has also adopted the
principle that a hostile housing environment sexual harassment claim
is actionable under the FHA.60 Furthermore, in an unpublished opinion,
the Ninth Circuit recognized a cause of action for sexual harassment
under the FHA by analyzing it the same way as a Title VII claim for
sexual harassment.61 The court noted that, in similar fashion to a Title
VII claim, it determines “whether an environment is sufficiently hostile
or abusive by ‘looking at all the circumstances, including frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening, or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with’ . . . a tenant’s living conditions.”62
E. Eleventh Circuit’s History of Interpretation of the FHA as Applied to
Sexual Harassment
The Eleventh Circuit’s history of addressing the FHA’s coverage of
sexual harassment claims in the housing environment is minute. A
claim for sexual harassment under the FHA was brought to the circuit’s
attention in 2012 in Tagliaferri v. Winter Park Housing Authority.63 The
court reasoned that, although it had yet to address whether sexual
harassment was actionable under the FHA, it did not need to at that
time. Both parties agreed that to bring a claim for sexual harassment
under the FHA, it had to be severe and pervasive enough to amount to
sexual harassment claims brought as employment discrimination.64
Given the specific facts of Tagliaferri, the court easily determined that

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
2000)).
63.
64.

Id. at 1090.
Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946, 947 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 947 (quoting Honce, 1 F.3d at 1089).
DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008.
Hall v. Meadowood Ltd P’ship, 7 F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. (quoting Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.
486 F. App’x 771 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 774.
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the standard of severe and pervasive was not met, so it declined to
assess the claim further.65
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
The question whether sexual harassment can be brought as a claim
for sex discrimination under the FHA was one of first impression for the
Eleventh Circuit in Fox.66 The court applied a de novo standard of
review to the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, as well as the district court’s
interpretation of the FHA statute.67 With this standard of review, the
court accepted “the complaint’s allegations as true and constru[ed] them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”68
A. Court’s Discussion of the Federal FHA
The Eleventh Circuit opinion, issued by Judge Jill Pryor, is a
relatively short and succinct discussion of the question presented and
relevant legal authority that led the court to its interpretation of the
FHA and its ultimate decision.69 The discussion begins with the court’s
statutory interpretation of the FHA to determine its plain meaning.
Under the FHA, it is “unlawful to ‘discriminate against any person in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because
of . . . sex.’”70 Based on the court’s statutory interpretation of this
provision’s plain meaning, along with support from Burrage v. United
States,71 which held that “because of” and “based-on” within statutory
language dictates “but-for causality,”72 it held that a tenant or potential
homebuyer is protected under the FHA from being treated differently or
less favorably in their housing terms, conditions, or privileges if she
would not have received that treatment but-for her sex.73
After determining the plain meaning of the statutory provision at
issue, the court moved forward with its interpretation of the FHA by
looking at cases that analyzed and compared the similar Title VII
65. Id.
66. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1295.
67. Id. at 1295 (citing Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange,
Georgia, 940 F.3d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 2019)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1293.
70. Id. at 1296 (quoting 42 U.S.C § 3604(b)).
71. 571 U.S. 204 (2014).
72. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1296 (quoting Burrage, 571 U.S. at 213).
73. Id. at 1296.
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language. Other circuits that have faced the same problem have
adopted this approach, so the Eleventh Circuit followed suit.74 It relied
heavily on the Supreme Court of the United States holding in Meritor,75
where the court “ruled that ‘without question’ sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII’s nearly
identical prohibition on ‘discrimination . . . because of . . . sex.’”76 Judge
Pryor noted that the Supreme Court in Meritor actually adopted some
of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning from its decision in Henson v. City of
Dundee.77 In Henson, a female officer employed by the Dundee Police
Department brought a Title VII claim against the City of Dundee,
alleging that she had been sexually harassed while on the job. The
plaintiff alleged three types of sexual harassment: (1) the chief of the
police department created a hostile and offensive work environment for
the women working at the police station; (2) her resignation was
essentially a constructive discharge based on her sex; and (3) the chief
of the police department prevented the plaintiff from attending the
police academy because she refused to engage in sexual relations with
him.78
In that opinion, the court “held that ‘a hostile or offensive
atmosphere created by sexual harassment can, standing alone,
constitute a violation of Title VII.’”79
The court further explained its rationale by stating “that a ‘pattern of
sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee because of her sex is a
pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of
one sex with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.’”80 So, while Title VII doesn’t explicitly state that sexual
harassment in the workplace is prohibited, since sexual harassment
constitutes differential and less favorable treatment based on one’s sex,
it is nevertheless actionable under the statute. The court noted that,
since these two noteworthy decisions have been handed down, it has
continuously ruled that sexual harassment equates to unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII, as long as the plaintiff can prove that
she would not have been harassed but-for her sex.81 Based on this
analysis of Title VII and its similarities to the FHA in its language and

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
477 U.S. 57.
Fox, 4 F.4th at 1296 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
Id.
Henson, 682 F.2d at 899–900.
Fox, 4 F.4th at 1296 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
Id. at 1297.
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prior applications, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the language of
“the FHA prohibits sexual harassment.”82
The court ultimately held that, in the Eleventh Circuit, both types of
sexual harassment, quid pro quo and hostile housing environment, are
actionable under the FHA.83 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove that
her sex was the “but-for” cause of the harassment.84 The court noted
that, while sexual harassment is not explicitly prohibited in the
statutory language of the FHA, the statute has a very broad purpose.85
Drafting the language of the FHA in such a broad, wide-reaching way
may have been inadvertent, or it may have been with specific intent.86
Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit’s broad statutory interpretation is
justified. As a result, the FHA’s prohibition of discrimination based on
sex includes sexual harassment within the housing context.87
B. Court’s Discussion of the Florida FHA
Despite the fact that Ms. Fox’s complaint alleged a violation of the
Florida FHA and the federal FHA, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion did
not mention an analysis of the Florida statute or whether it provides a
cause of action for sexual harassment. However, it can reasonably be
inferred that, since the language is nearly identical to that found in the
FHA, the court’s analysis and application would be similar, if not the
same.88 That being said, it is possible that a claim for sexual
harassment, either quid pro quo or hostile environment, will be
actionable under the Florida FHA as sex discrimination.
C. Court’s Discretion to Remand
Since the order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss was
based on the district court’s finding that the FHA did not provide for a
sexual harassment cause of action, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that
ruling and remanded the case to the district court to be re-evaluated
82. Id. at 1296.
83. Id. at 1297.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1297 n.8 (quoting Ga. State Conf., 940 F.3d at 631).
86. “‘The language of the FHA is broad and inclusive’, ‘prohibits a wide range of
conduct,’ ‘has a broad remedial purpose,’ and ‘is written in decidedly far-reaching terms.’”
Ga. State Conf., 940 F.3d at 631–32 (quoting City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d
1260, 1278–79, examining the legislative history of the FHA shows that Congress
attempted to reach a group of broad social ills by allowing suits by a large group of
potential plaintiffs and prohibiting a wide range of conduct).
87. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1297.
88. Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285.
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based on its new holding.89 Rather than deciding for itself whether Ms.
Fox alleged sexual harassment that was sufficiently within the FHA’s
unlawful conduct, the court used its discretion given to them by
Singleton v. Wulff90 to remand it to the district court.91 The Supreme
Court of the United States in Singleton held that the court of appeals
has discretion to decide which questions it wants to hear and resolve for
the first time on appeal.92 Based on the individual facts of each case, the
court may choose to either hand down a ruling on the issue, or remand
the case to the district court to rule on the issue with further
guidance.93 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit did not feel the need to
resolve the issue, and felt that the district court would be betterequipped to tackle the question.94
V. IMPLICATIONS
As this question was one of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit,
the holding in Fox puts it in a group with at least four of its sister
circuits throughout the United States, which have interpreted the FHA
to provide a cause of action for sexual harassment within the housing
environment.95 Every other circuit that has faced the same question has
ruled affirmatively, prohibiting both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment under the FHA.96 And now the
Eleventh Circuit joins, providing tenants and renters a means of
recovery if one is sexually harassed by their landlord whether in the
renting or selling process, or during their stay at the respective
property or dwelling. Within the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction,
landlords can no longer proposition their tenants with some kind of
89. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1297.
90. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
91. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1297.
92. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121.
93. Id.
94. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1297 n.9. “We acknowledge Ms. Fox’s argument on appeal that her
second amended complaint adequately alleged violations of the FHA’s prohibition on
sexual harassment. We believe, however, that the district court is best suited to address
this question in the first instance.”
95. See United States v. Hurt, 676 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that FHA
provides cause of action for hostile housing environment and quid pro quo sexual
harassment); DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008 (holding that sexual harassment constitutions sex
discrimination under the FHA); Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090 (holding that sexual harassment
claims are actionable when they create a hostile housing environment and interferes with
the victim’s use and enjoyment of the premises); Hall, 7 F. App’x. at 689 (holding that a
sexual harassment claim under the FHA is analyzed the same way as a sexual
harassment claim under Title VII).
96. Fox, 4 F.4th at 1295–96.

1432

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

sexual arrangement in exchange for a lower rent or other types of
benefits related to their housing situation.97 Often times, these types of
instances stem from the landlord’s relatively superior position of power,
as well as the unequal bargaining power between the two parties.
Tenants and renters also will no longer have to put up with a landlord’s
continuous sexually inappropriate behavior, comments, or propositions
in fear of being evicted in retaliation.
Landlords, property owners, and managers now have the absolute
duty to refrain from sexually harassing or discriminating against their
tenants or potential tenants, as well as the responsibility to ensure that
their employees and subordinates also refrain from those types of
actions. If an employee of a property owner or landlord engages in
unlawful conduct under the FHA, both the employee and the landlord
or property owner can be held liable for the prohibited conduct.98 This
will no doubt have implications for the hiring process of those that
landlords or property owners choose to have work for them, like
adopting a more careful and strict hiring process, for example.99
It is likely that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Fox will have a
continued unifying effect on other United States circuits. Going
forward, it is probable that any circuit that has not adopted the same
holding, (every U.S. circuit besides the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh) and is faced with the same question as presented here,
will rule in the same way. Further, just as the interpretation of Title
VII has evolved over time to broaden the scope of its application, the
FHA will also likely continue to broaden in the scope of its application
since the two statutes are so similar in purpose and construction. In
fact, since the language of the FHA is even broader than Title VII’s, it is
reasonable to believe that the FHA may even reach a broader coverage
than its counterpart.100
The holding in Fox represents a general trend in the United States
towards fighting for the rights of those who have fallen victim to sexual
assault and sexual harassment.101 This can be seen in the growing
#MeToo movement that has garnered much of the country’s attention
and admiration within the past few years.102 Furthermore, there has

97. Dave Linn, Annotation, Sexual Harassment by Landlord, 3 Am. Juris. Proof of
Facts 3d 581 § 1 (1989).
98. Fuhr, supra note 3, at § 10.
99. Id. § 3.
100. Robert G. Schwemm and Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment
Under the Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771 (2002).
101. Fuhr, supra note 3, at § 2.
102. Noveck and Dale, supra note 1.
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been an overall heightened focus on fighting for the rights and freedoms
of all individuals throughout the nation—specifically those groups who
have been marginalized in one way or another.103 The days of
individuals sitting by and idly watching injustices occur are over.
People are now motivated more than ever to fight for what is right.
While the fight for the civil rights of every individual in the nation is far
from over, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that sexual harassment is now
actionable under the FHA is a step in the right direction. It now gives a
previously excluded group recourse for the injustices they may face
going forward, which is what many hope to see in other areas of the
United States’ justice system.

103. See Ralph Ranalli, Americans’ attitudes toward civil rights and government are
more aligned since pandemic, new Carr Center polling shows, HARVARD KENNEDY
SCHOOL,
(July
19,
2021),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policytopics/democracy-governance/americans-attitudes-toward-civil-rights-and.

